

# Bayesian Reasoning in an Abductive Mechanism for Argument Generation and Analysis

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## Abstract

Our argumentation system, NAG, uses Bayesian networks in a user model and in a normative model to assemble and assess arguments which balance persuasiveness with normative correctness. Attentional focus is simulated in both models to select relevant subnetworks for Bayesian propagation. The subnetworks are expanded in an iterative abductive process until argumentative goals are achieved in both models, when the argument is presented to the user.

## Introduction

In this paper, we describe the operation of our argument generation-analysis system, NAG (*Nice Argument Generator*). Given a goal proposition, NAG generates *nice* arguments, i.e., arguments that are normatively strong while also being persuasive for the target audience. NAG also analyzes users' arguments, and prepares rebuttals if appropriate. The focus of this paper is on the generation aspect of our work.

Figure 1 shows the main modules of NAG. The Strategist may receive as input a goal proposition or a user-generated argument. During argument generation, it activates a generation-analysis cycle as follows (§ *Generation-Analysis Cycle*). Firstly, it uses semantic activation to quickly form an initial *Argument Graph* for an argument, or to quickly extend an already existing *Argument Graph*. An *Argument Graph* is a network with nodes that represent propositions, and links that represent the inferences that connect these propositions. The Strategist then calls the Generator to continue the argument building process (§ *Extending the Argument Graph*). The Generator fleshes out the *Argument Graph* by activating *Reasoning Agents* to consult several sources of information, and incorporating the inferences and propositions returned by these agents into the *Argument Graph*. This *Argument Graph* is returned to the Strategist, which passes it to the Analyzer (§ *Argument Analysis*) to evaluate its niceness.

To estimate the persuasive power of an argument represented by an *Argument Graph*, the Analyzer consults a revisable user model that reflects the beliefs of the target audience; a normative model is used to gauge the normative strength of an argument. Belief updating in both the user and




Figure 1: System Architecture

the normative model is done by a constrained Bayesian propagation scheme. If the Analyzer reports that the *Argument Graph* is nice enough, the Strategist presents an argument based upon this graph to the user (§ *Argument Presentation*). Otherwise, the Analyzer highlights the weaknesses to be fixed in the argument, and the *Argument Graph* is returned to the Strategist for another cycle of argument extension and analysis. This process is typically performed more than once before the argument is presented to the user. It iterates until a successful *Argument Graph* is built, or NAG is unable to continue, e.g., due to time running out or failing to find further evidence.

## Knowledge Representation

When constructing an argument, NAG relies on a normative model composed of different types of *Knowledge Bases* (KBs) and a user model also composed of different types of KBs which represent the user's presumed beliefs and inferences. A single KB represents information in one form, e.g., a semantic network (SN), Bayesian network (BN), rule-based system or database. During argument generation, relevant material from several KBs may need to be combined into a common representation. We have chosen BNs for this purpose because of their ability to represent normatively correct reasoning under uncertainty.

When constructing an *Argument Graph*, NAG develops two BNs: the BN forming one of the KBs in the user model, and the BN forming one of the KBs in the normative model. As arguments are built up, material obtained from other KBs

may be converted to BN form and added to the appropriate BN, e.g., material from a rule-based system in the user model may be added to the user model BN (§ *Extending the Argument Graph*). To reduce the amount of information NAG must deal with, we apply a focusing mechanism which highlights the portion of the complete BN in each model that is needed for the current argument (§ *Focusing the Argument*). Hence, each of the user model and the normative model contains a single Bayesian subnetwork that is in focus. The structural intersection of these Bayesian subnetworks forms the Argument Graph. When analyzing this graph, propagation is performed twice, once over the Bayesian subnetwork in the user model and once over the Bayesian subnetwork in the normative model, each time using probabilistic information sourced from within the model being propagated (§ *Argument Analysis*). Thus, we measure the strength of the same argument in the user model and the normative model.

### Generation-Analysis Cycle

NAG receives the following inputs: (1) a proposition to be argued for; (2) an initial argument context; and (3) two target ranges of degrees of belief to be achieved (one each for the normative model and the user model). The initial argument context, denoted  $context_0$ , is composed of the propositions and concepts mentioned in a preamble to the argument plus the argument's goal; this context is expanded as the Argument Graph grows. The degrees of belief to be achieved are expressed as ranges of probabilities, e.g., [0.5, 0.6], in order to be able to represent a variety of goals, e.g., inducing doubt when a strong belief is inappropriate.

Upon completion of the argumentation process, the Strategist produces an Argument Graph which starts from *admissible premises* and ends in the goal proposition. Admissible premises are propositions that start out being believed by NAG and the user (sufficiently for the argument to work).

The Strategist executes the following algorithm during argument generation. In principle, this procedure is applicable to any proposition, and hence also to special forms such as promises and modal propositions. However, it does not currently have facilities to treat these forms in any special way.

#### Generation-Analysis Algorithm

1.  $i \leftarrow 0$ .
2. Clamp any items in the current context,  $context_i$ , and perform spreading activation. This yields an Argument Graph containing: the clamped nodes, the activated nodes (whose activation exceeds a threshold), plus the links connecting these nodes (§ *Focusing the Argument*).
3. Identify new subgoals in the current Argument Graph (§ *Choosing Argument Subgoals*).
4. Pass the argument subgoals identified in Step 3 to the Generator, which adds the new information returned by its Reasoning Agents to the current Argument Graph (§ *Extending the Argument Graph*).
5. Pass the Argument Graph generated in Step 4 to the Analyzer for evaluation (§ *Argument Analysis*).
6. If the Analyzer reports that the current Argument Graph is sufficiently nice, then present an argument based on this




Figure 2: Sample Semantic-Bayesian Network

graph to the user, and wait for a response (§ *Argument Presentation*). Otherwise, continue.

7.  $i \leftarrow i + 1$ .
8.  $context_i \leftarrow context_{i-1} +$  new nodes connected to the goal during cycle  $i-1$ .
9. Go to Step 2.

When receiving a user's argument, an analysis-generation cycle is activated. This cycle begins in Step 5, which results in the acceptance of the user's argument if no flaws are detected. Otherwise, the cycle is completed, and the generation part of the cycle is performed (Steps 2, 3 and 4) to try to bridge small inferential gaps in the user's argument. This cycle is repeated only a few times, since large gaps in a user's argument make it more likely that NAG and the user are using different lines of reasoning.

#### Focusing the Argument

Bayesian network propagation (Pearl 1988) is an NP-hard problem in the general case (Cooper 1990). NAG is designed to be an interactive system, potentially drawing upon very large knowledge bases, so complete propagation over large BNs is not feasible. In addition, NAG's user model is designed to model human cognitive abilities, and humans normally cannot absorb and analyze all data relevant to a complex problem. To cope with both of these limits on complexity we emulate the principal means available to humans for applying limited cognitive capacity to problem solving, namely attention (see, for example, Baars 1987).

NAG uses two hierarchical SNs, one built on top of the user model BN and one built on top of the normative model BN, to capture associative connections between information items (Figure 2 illustrates a semantic-Bayesian network). The initial semantic-Bayesian networks are currently built manually, but they may be automatically extended during argument generation (§ *Extending the Argument Graph*). Both the SN and the BN are used by NAG to simulate attentional focus in each model. However, the resulting Argument Graph contains only propositions and links from the BN.

NAG takes the context in which the argument occurs as providing an initial set of salient objects. For example, if the user presents an argument to NAG, the concepts occurring in the propositions within the argument or in the preceding




Figure 3: Initial Argument Graph for the Asteroid Example

discussion will be marked as salient. We use activation with decay (Anderson 1983), spreading from the salient objects (which are clamped) to determine the focus of attention. All items in the semantic-Bayesian networks which achieve a threshold activation level during the spreading activation process are brought into the span of attention. This process passes activation through the semantic-Bayesian networks, each node being activated to the degree implied by the activation levels of its neighbors, the strength of association to those neighbors, and its immediately prior activation level (vitiating by a time-decay factor). By these means we have a direct implementation of attention which we use to zero-in upon the more relevant portions of the semantic-Bayesian networks. This iterative process ceases when an activation cycle fails to activate a new node.

Determining the more relevant portions of the semantic-Bayesian networks in this way allows NAG to save processing time in two ways: NAG restricts itself to searching for information connected with the propositions in focus (§ *Choosing Argument Subgoals*), rather than all of the propositions known to it; and NAG analyzes its arguments with respect to just the same propositions in focus, saving time during Bayesian propagation (§ *Argument Analysis*).

**Focusing – Example.** Consider the generation of an argument for the proposition “A large *iridium*-rich *asteroid* struck *Earth* about 65-million-years *BC*,” preceded by the preamble “Approximately 65-million-years *BC* the *dinosaurs*, large *reptiles* that dominated the *Earth* for many millions of years, became *extinct*. At about the same time, the number of *giant sequoias* in *California* greatly increased.” Initially, the goal proposition and the preamble activate any propositions containing two or more of the italicized concepts, i.e., nodes  $N_1$ ,  $N_3$ ,  $N_7$  and  $N_{12}$  in Figure 3 (shown in dark grey boxes).

After clamping the nodes that correspond to this discourse context and performing spreading activation, additional nodes become activated in the SNs and BNs. All the nodes whose activation level exceeds a threshold are retained and added to the Argument Graph. For this example, this yields an Argument Graph composed of nodes  $N_2$ ,  $N_4$ ,  $N_9$ ,  $N_{10}$  and  $N_{13}$  (shown in light grey boxes in Figure 3) in

addition to the clamped nodes. The links between the nodes in Figure 3 were obtained from the BNs. However, the activation of these nodes involved spreading activation through the BNs and the SNs. Additional nodes, such as [California has fault-lines] (not shown in Figure 3), were activated via the SNs. However, if no causal or evidential links are found between such nodes and the goal, they are eventually excluded from the Argument Graph.

### Choosing Argument Subgoals

Having used semantic priming to add items of likely interest to the current Argument Graph, NAG must now decide which of these newly added items should be set as argument subgoals requiring further inspection. At present, nodes which have a path to the goal in the Argument Graph or whose activation level is high (exceeds a subgoaling threshold) are tagged as subgoals to be investigated, provided they have not been previously passed to the Reasoning Agents (§ *Extending the Argument Graph*).

**Choosing Subgoals – Example Continued.** At this stage in the argument planning process, none of the nodes in the current Argument Graph (Figure 3) have been passed to the Reasoning Agents. Thus, the following nodes are passed to the Reasoning Agents in order to obtain additional information (§ *Extending the Argument Graph*): those in the subgraph containing the goal node ( $N_9$ ,  $N_{12}$  and  $N_{13}$ ), plus the three clamped (highly active) nodes in the graph fragments not connected to the goal node ( $N_1$ ,  $N_3$  and  $N_7$ ).

### Extending the Argument Graph

The initial Argument Graph consists of the subset of the BNs which was activated by the attentional mechanism. The Generator then activates the Reasoning Agents to collect information relevant to each subgoal in the current Argument Graph. Upon their return, the Generator must determine: (1) which newly returned inferences should be integrated into the Argument Graph; (2) the structure of the additions to the Argument Graph representing the new inferences; and (3) the parameters of the new inferences and propositions.

**Which propositions and inferences to integrate.** New propositions returned by the Reasoning Agents are added to the current Argument Graph as new nodes. NAG decides whether to introduce new inferences returned by the Reasoning Agents into the Argument Graph (or to replace existing inferences with new ones) by applying the following rules, which ensure that each relationship between propositions in the Argument Graph is represented only once:

1. *At most one inference may directly connect any two propositions in the Bayesian subnetwork in each of the user model and the normative model.*
2. *When selecting from multiple candidate inferences, prefer inferences sourced from more expressive representations, where expressiveness means how much probabilistic information can be expressed by the representation.*

For example, assume NAG’s qualitative rule-based system agent finds a rule stating “If  $D$  then  $E$  is possible”. If the agent responsible for quantitative rule-based systems also finds the rule “If  $D$  then  $E$  with prob =  $x$ ”, which NAG

translates into  $D \xrightarrow{evidence} E$  with  $P(E|D) = x$  (assuming independence from other links incident upon node  $E$ ), then which of these inference rules, if any, should be added to the Argument Graph? The first rule above states that at most one of these two inferences will be incorporated into the current Argument Graph.<sup>1</sup> NAG selects which one of the two inferences it will incorporate by applying the second rule. This is done via the following preference ordering for expressiveness: BNs, quantitative rule-based systems, qualitative rule-based systems and database lookups.

**Structure of the new propositions and inferences.** The various Reasoning Agents return argument fragments which take the form of propositions linked by inferences. After the above mentioned rules have been applied to determine which of these fragments should be incorporated in the Argument Graph, the selected fragments are added to the Bayesian subnetwork in the appropriate model, e.g., fragments sourced from KBs in the normative model are added to the subnetwork in the normative model.

**Adding parameters for the propositions and inferences.** Normally, the prior probability of a proposition returned by a Reasoning Agent is copied directly into the Argument Graph. This works so long as the new values fill gaps in the Argument Graph. However, if the current Argument Graph already contains a prior probability for the proposition under consideration, then that previous probability will be retained and the new information ignored.<sup>2</sup>

Adding information to the Argument Graph about joint conditional probabilities associated with new inferences is done as follows. If a Reasoning Agent can provide complete conditional probability information for a new inference which takes into account other inferences that impinge upon the proposition targeted by this inference, then this information replaces the corresponding conditional probability matrix. However, if complete probabilistic information is unavailable, the new information (often a simple conditional probability) is assumed to be conditionally independent of the other inferences impinging upon the node in question. Since assuming conditional independence is dangerous, NAG records this assumption in a log file, so that a human operator can diagnose where NAG went wrong should one of its arguments be incorrect. The operator can then edit NAG’s KBs to remove the offending inference or to add extra information about the joint conditional probabilities.

### Extending the Graph – Example Continued

In this step, the information returned by the Reasoning Agents is incorporated into the Argument Graph (Figure 4). Some of the nodes found by these agents have already been activated through spreading activation (those in light grey in Figure 4), while others are new to the Argument Graph (those in white) (node  $N_{15}$  and the links  $N_{11} \rightarrow N_{15}$  and

<sup>1</sup>NAG does not try to merge information gleaned from more than one available source since it is unclear how to do so.

<sup>2</sup>Since we are not modeling the reliability of the various KBs, there is no reason to prefer the prior probabilities obtained from one KB to conflicting priors obtained from another. Thus, we retain whatever information is already in the BN.




Figure 4: Argument Graph for the Asteroid Example

$N_6 \rightarrow N_2$  have not been discovered yet). All the links returned by the Reasoning Agents are causal or evidential, as these are the only types of relations incorporated at present in the arguments generated by NAG. Some of this information will be included in the final Argument Graph presented to the user, e.g., the newly found node  $N_6$  and the link connecting  $N_9 \rightarrow N_6$ , while other information, e.g., node  $N_5$ , will be eventually excluded (§ *Argument Presentation*). Upon completion of this step, the Argument Graph consists of two separate subgraphs: one containing nodes  $N_5$ – $N_{14}$  and another containing nodes  $N_1$ – $N_4$ .

### Argument Analysis

The process of computing the anticipated belief in a goal proposition as a result of presenting an argument starts with the belief in the premises of the Argument Graph and ends with a new degree of belief in the goal proposition. The Analyzer computes the new belief in a proposition by combining the previous belief in it with the result of applying the inferences which precede this proposition in the Argument Graph. This belief computation process is performed by applying propagation procedures to the Bayesian subnetwork corresponding to the current Argument Graph in the user model and separately to the subnetwork corresponding to the current Argument Graph in the normative model.

In propagating only over the subnetworks initially seeded by the focusing mechanism (§ *Focusing the Argument*) and extended with information returned by the Reasoning Agents (§ *Extending the Argument Graph*), NAG ignores those parts of the complete BNs in the user and normative models not deemed relevant to the current argument. Propagating over the subnetwork corresponding to the current Argument Graph in the user and normative models is much faster than having to perform propagation over the complete BN in each model, but the trade off is a less accurate estimate of the final belief in the goal proposition. Still, in a system designed to be interactive, some such trade off is necessary in view of the complexity of Bayesian propagation.

After propagation, the Analyzer returns the following measures for an argument: its *normative strength*, which is its effect on the belief in the goal proposition in the nor-

mative model, and its *persuasiveness*, which is its effect on the user's belief in the goal proposition (estimated according to the user model). Of course, an argument's persuasiveness may be quite different from its normative strength.

After the Analyzer has evaluated the normative strength and persuasiveness of the Argument Graph it returns an assessment, which points out any propositions within the Argument Graph that are not sufficiently supported.<sup>3</sup> The generation of support for such propositions is automatically handled by the Generation-Analysis algorithm as follows. Propositions that became connected to the goal during the current cycle are automatically added to the context (Step 8 of the Generation-Analysis algorithm). These propositions are clamped in Step 2 of the next cycle, and those which have not been previously passed to the Reasoning Agents are identified as subgoals (Step 3). It is possible that some propositions will remain insufficiently supported after being investigated by the Reasoning Agents. Often, these propositions are eventually removed from the Argument Graph after alternative, stronger subarguments have been found (§ *Argument Presentation*).

After integrating the new subarguments into the Argument Graph, the now enlarged Argument Graph is again sent to the Analyzer for inspection. Thus, by completing additional focusing-generation-analysis cycles, NAG can often improve Argument Graphs that are initially unsatisfactory.

### Analyzing the Graph – Example Continued

The argument that can be built at this stage has three main branches: (1) from nodes  $N_5$ ,  $N_6$  and  $N_8$  to  $N_9$  and then  $N_{12}$ , (2) from  $N_7$  to  $N_{10}$ , then  $N_9$  and then  $N_{12}$ , and (3) from  $N_{11}$  and  $N_{14}$  to  $N_{13}$  and then  $N_{12}$ . However, only  $N_7$  is currently believed by the user, hence it is the only admissible premise among the potential premise nodes. Thus, the anticipated final belief in the goal node in both the normative and the user model falls short of the desired ranges. This is reported by the Analyzer to the Strategist. Nodes  $N_5$ ,  $N_6$ ,  $N_8$ – $N_{11}$ ,  $N_{13}$  and  $N_{14}$  are now added to the context (which initially consisted of  $N_1$ ,  $N_3$ ,  $N_7$  and  $N_{12}$ ), and the next cycle of the Generation-Analysis algorithm is activated. After spreading activation (Step 2), several nodes become active. However, the main node of interest in this example is  $N_2$ , which is activated by  $N_1$ ,  $N_3$  and  $N_6$ . The activation from  $N_6$  results in the argument fragment composed of nodes  $N_1$ – $N_4$  being linked to the goal. The subgoal selection step (Step 3) now identifies nodes  $N_2$ ,  $N_4$ ,  $N_5$ ,  $N_6$ ,  $N_8$ ,  $N_{10}$ ,  $N_{11}$  and  $N_{14}$  as subgoals to be passed to the Generator, since these nodes now have a path to the goal node and have not been previously passed to the Reasoning Agents. These agents can find the following new information only: node  $N_{15}$  and links  $N_6 \rightarrow N_2$  and  $N_{11} \rightarrow N_{15}$ . The resulting Argument Graph is returned to the Analyzer again (Step 5), which determines that the anticipated belief in the goal is now within the target ranges in both models. Thus, the Argument Graph can be passed to the presentation step.

<sup>3</sup>Argument flaws such as reasoning cycles and weak inferences are also detected by the Analyzer, and are corrected by the Strategist and the Generator if possible. However, discussion of the correction procedures is beyond the scope of this paper.

## Argument Presentation

During argument presentation, NAG attempts to minimize the size of the Argument Graph by searching for the subgraph with the fewest nodes which still yields a sufficiently nice argument. During this process, it tries to make the argument more concise by iteratively deleting nodes and invoking the Analyzer to determine whether the belief in the goal proposition in the now smaller Argument Graph still suffices. This process is desirable since, upon completion of the generation-analysis cycles, some of the propositions in the Argument Graph may be supported more strongly than is necessary for the argument to work.

The subgraph corresponding to an argument generated for the asteroid example is outlined with a dashed box in Figure 4. Premise nodes  $N_4$ ,  $N_5$ ,  $N_8$  and  $N_{14}$  are omitted because of their weak contribution to the goal. The subgraph composed of  $N_{15} \rightarrow N_{11} \rightarrow N_{13}$  is omitted because the desired belief ranges can be achieved without it.

At present, the resulting Argument Graph can be rendered graphically through a graphical interface which allows users to build and receive arguments in an annotated network form. Methods for rendering NAG's output in English, such as those described in (Huang & Fiedler 1997; Reed & Long 1997), are also being considered.

## Evaluation

A preliminary Web-based evaluation of NAG's output was conducted by a pre-test elicitation of subjects' beliefs regarding the following key propositions in the argument in Figure 4: ( $N_{12}$ ) a large asteroid struck the Earth about 65 million years ago, ( $N_2$ ) there was a sudden cooling of the Earth's climate about 65 million years ago, ( $N_{7.1}$ ) iridium is abundant in the Earth's crust, ( $N_{7.2}$ ) iridium is abundant in asteroids (the last two factors are related to node  $N_7$ ). According to the replies, an argument was selected among several options previously generated by NAG. For instance, if a respondent indicated belief in  $N_2$ , then a subargument supporting this proposition was omitted. After presenting an argument to a respondent, a post-test was administered to assess changes in belief in the pre-test propositions.

Among the 32 respondents, there was a clear tendency to shift belief towards the (final and intermediate) targets in response to NAG's argument. The following percentages of the respondents who had no opinion or a previous incorrect belief shifted to a correct belief: 58% for  $N_{12}$ , 36% for  $N_2$ , 83% for  $N_{7.1}$ , and 92.5% for  $N_{7.2}$  (which was sourced from the Encyclopedia Britannica). These shifts represent 50%, 32%, 84% and 181% of a standard deviation unit respectively, indicating that NAG's arguments were reasonably persuasive.<sup>4</sup> In future, we shall undertake more rigorous testing in order to compare NAG's arguments against human-generated arguments.

NAG was tested on five sample scenarios in order to assess the effect of using spreading activation to simulate attention.

<sup>4</sup>Technically, due to the high variation in the responses, only the largest of these shifts is statistically significant with  $p = 0.035$  (when a normal distribution is assumed).

Table 1: Test scenarios for NAG

Name	# nodes in SN	# nodes in BN	average connect.	ave. time with SA	ave. time w/o SA
asteroid	100	50	~3.25	12.5(4)	25(4)
finance	100	120	~4	32.8(5)	131.4(5)
alphabet	50	50	~4	8.5(4)	25.8(4)
phobos	20	30	~3	3.5(2)	6.0(2)
papers	20	20	~3	3.3(2)	6.5(2)

Table 1 shows the number of nodes and average connectivity in these scenarios, and the average time (in cpu seconds) required for generating arguments with and without spreading activation (columns 5 and 6 respectively; the number of runs performed appears in parenthesis). These results were obtained using mid-range (spreading activation) parameter values for a variety of goals (one goal per run). In all but one run the same arguments were generated with and without spreading activation. A slower decay and a lower activation threshold (§ *Focusing the Argument*) resulted in the incorporation of more nodes into the Argument Graph. In extreme cases this yielded longer argument generation times than without spreading activation due to the need to inspect nodes that were only marginally related to the goal. A quick decay and a high activation threshold resulted in the incorporation of fewer nodes into the Argument Graph. In extreme cases this also extended argument generation times, since the search for an argument became mainly goal based.

### Related Research

The mechanism presented in this paper uses Bayesian reasoning to perform abduction during argument generation, and performs spreading activation to focus the argument. This use of spreading activation resembles Charniak and Goldman's (1993) use of a marker passing mechanism to focus attention in a Bayesian plan recognition system.

The approach of "interpretation as abduction" used in (Hobbs *et al.* 1993) aims to recover the premises and inferential links which lead to the conclusion of some given argument. This is similar to NAG's analysis-generation cycle. However, NAG is a system that reasons under uncertainty and can generate as well as analyze its own arguments. A generative system based on the work of Hobbs *et al.* is described in (Thomason, Hobbs, & Moore 1996). That system deals with what can be readily inferred, and so deleted, during communication, but the generated discourse does not present an argument in support of a proposition. Horacek (1997) and Mehl (1994) describe systems that turn an explicit argument into one where easily inferred information is left implicit. However, both of these systems require a complete argument as input, while NAG constructs its own arguments.

NAG's generation-analysis cycle resembles the propose-evaluate-modify cycle in (Chu-Carroll & Carberry 1995). However, NAG uses Bayesian reasoning to determine the impact of an argument on an addressee's beliefs, and it may combine several lines of reasoning to achieve its goal, rather than selecting a single proposition.

### Conclusion

We have offered a mechanism for argument generation and analysis which uses a series of focusing-generation-analysis cycles to build two BNs (one in the normative model and another in the user model) that contain the information required to construct a nice argument. This use of two models enables us to distinguish between normatively correct and persuasive arguments. An attentional mechanism is used to focus the search during argument generation, and partial propagation, performed over the Bayesian subnetworks in focus (the current Argument Graph), is used to estimate the impact of the resultant argument on an addressee's beliefs. A preliminary evaluation of NAG's arguments yielded encouraging results; an evaluation of NAG's attentional mechanism shows that it substantially reduces argument generation times without appreciable effects on argument quality.

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